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If the government becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds con-
tempt for law; it invites every man to become a law unto
himself; it invites anarchy.'
I. INTRODUCTION
On April 2, 1990, Humberto Alvarez-Machain, a Mexican med-
ical doctor, barely had time to realize that the men who entered his
office were not seeking his professional services. Immediately after
entering, one of them placed a gun to his head and forced him to
take his first steps toward a criminal trial in the United States.2
Despite official Mexican protests,s the United States Supreme
Court rejected his argument that U.S. courts lacked personal juris-
diction.4 Specifically, he argued that his presence before them vio-
lated Mexico's extradition treaty with the United States.' The Su-
preme Court held that the extradition treaty' did not prohibit
abductions. Therefore, the Court reasoned, it did not provide Dr.
Alvarez-Machain with a defense to the jurisdiction of U.S. courts
which tried him for violations of U.S. criminal laws.' Though it
acknowledged that the abduction may have violated "general inter-
1. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
2. United States v. Caro-Quintero, 745 F. Supp. 599, 603 (C.D. Cal. 1990), aff'd sub
nom. per curiam, United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 946 F.2d 1466 (9th Cir. 1991), rev'd,
112 S. Ct. 2188 (1992).
3. United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. 2188, 2197 n.1 (1992) (Stevens, J., dis-
senting); see also Joint Appendix to the Parties' Briefs at 33, 35, 39, 53, United States v.
Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. 2188 (1992) (No. 91-712).
4. Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. at 2190.
5. Id.
6. Extradition Treaty, May 4, 1978, U.S.-Mex., 31 U.S.T. 5059.
7. Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. at 2195-96.
8. Id. at 2190.
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national law principles,"9 the Court still held that U.S. courts had
jurisdiction. 10
The extension of the Ker-Frisbie doctrine was essential to the
Court's reasoning. That doctrine posits that a forcible abduction of
a defendant does not deprive the court of jurisdiction." Yet, for at
least three reasons, the Ker-Frisbie doctrine does not apply, as the
Supreme Court suggested in United States v. Alvarez-Machain,
2
to cases of unilateral U.S. abductions which violate international
law when the injured state protests and demands the return of the
abducted person.
The first reason, explored in Part II, is the lack of any doctri-
nal basis in the Ker decision itself, the common law precedents
upon which that decision relies, or subsequent Supreme Court
cases for the doctrine's extension to breaches of international law.
The second reason, discussed in Part III, is that customary inter-
national law prohibits unilateral abductions by nations and re-
quires the abducted person's restitution upon the injured nation's
demand. The third argument, examined in Part IV, is a principle
of statutory construction, much weightier than the Ker dictum and
its progeny. Relying on the Charming Betsy principle, courts
should construe U.S. law to avoid international law violations
whenever possible.
II. KER-FRISBIE AND ABDUCTIONS IN VIOLATION OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW: DOCTRINE OR DICTUM?
The Ker-Frisbie doctrine is this country's version of male cap-
tus, bene detentus, the theory that a court's personal jurisdiction
is unaffected by the manner in which a criminal defendant comes
before it.'3 The Supreme Court has invoked the doctrine to
9. Id. at 2196.
10. Id. at 2197.
11. The Court first broached the idea in Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436, 444 (1886) and
endorsed it in Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519, 522 (1952). In Alvarez-Machain the Court
stated "[i]f we conclude that the Treaty does not prohibit respondent's abduction, the rule
in Ker applies, and the court need not inquire as to how respondent came before it." Alva-
rez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. at 2193.
12. See United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. 2188, 2193, 2197 (1992).
13. See generally M. Cherif Bassiouni, Unlawful Seizures and Irregular Rendition De-
vices as Alternatives to Extradition, 7 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 25, 27 (1973); John G.
Kester, Some Myths of United States Extradition Law, 76 GEO. L.J. 1441, 1449 (1988) ("If a
judge or practitioner knows nothing else about extradition, he is likely to recall . . .the
notion that it matters not how a defendant comes before a court: once he is there, the court
1993]
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counter criminal defendant's constitutional challenges to personal
jurisdiction.1" Until Alvarez-Machain, the Court never used Ker-
Frisbie to defeat a challenge based on a violation of international
law.
15
This Part examines the doctrine's common law precursors, the
U.S. Supreme Court's holdings in Ker v. Illinois6 and Frisbie v.
Collins,17 and Ker-Frisbie's progeny. It concludes that these deci-
sions, as well as lower federal court decisions, provide little founda-
tion for the doctrine's extension to breaches of international law.
1 8
A. Ker's Precursors: The Common Law's Treatment of Ex-
traterritorial Abduction as a Bar to Jurisdiction in Criminal Tri-
als Before 1886
In Ker v. Illinois,9 Justice Miller expressly declined to ad-
dress the issue of whether a criminal defendant's abduction abroad
and enforced return to this country might deprive a state court of
personal jurisdiction. However, he observed that "authorities of
the highest respectability" 20 held that such a forcible abduction
would not bar the defendant's trial in a court before which he was
otherwise properly present.2" The Ker-Frisbie doctrine grew from
this dictum.22 Thus, Justice Miller's authorities are essential to the
doesn't care how, won't ask, and has full authority to try, convict, and send him to jail.");
Manuel R. Garcia-Mora, Criminal Jurisdiction of a State over Fugitives Brought from a
Foreign Country by Force or Fraud: A Comparative Study, 32 IND. L.J. 427, 435 (1957) (The
Ker-Frisbie doctrine "has been extended to include every conceivable situation lying outside
the provisions of an extradition treaty."); Jacques Semmelman, Due Process, International
Law, and Jurisdiction Over Criminal Defendants Abducted Extraterritorially: The Ker-
Frisbie Doctrine Reexamined, 30 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 513 (1992); Herbert B. Cherm-
side, Jr., Annotation, Jurisdiction of Federal Court to Try Criminal Defendant Who Al-
leges That He Was Brought Within United States Jurisdiction Illegally or as Result of
Fraud or Mistake, 28 A.L.R. FED. 685, 687 (1976).
14. See infra text accompanying notes 110-88.
15. See infra text accompanying notes 110-88.
16. 119 U.S. 436 (1886).
17. 342 U.S. 519 (1952).
18. A measure of the doctrine's wide scope is that commentators call situations identi-
fied by courts as beyond its reach "exceptions." See Chermside Jr., supra note 13, at 690;
Semmelman, supra note 13, at 551 (proposing an "international law exception").
19. 119 U.S. 436 (1886). For the facts of Ker, see infra note 82.
20. Ker, 119 U.S. at 444.
21. Id.
22. See, e.g., Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519 (1952). "This Court has never departed
from the rule announced in Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436, 444, that the power of a court to
try a person for crime is not impaired by the fact that he had been brought within the
court's jurisdiction by reason of a 'forcible abduction.'" Id. at 522.
[Vol. 25:1
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support of the doctrine's broad reading.
Ex parte Scott's is the first of these seven authorities. In that
1829 case, an English police officer brought an English woman
from Brussels to England, against her will, for trial on a perjury
charge. 4 She procured a writ of habeas corpus while awaiting trial
in prison.2 5 Lord Tenterden, C.J., rejected her argument that the
court should dismiss the case because her apprehension in a for-
eign country violated that foreign country's law.2 6 The court held
that inquiry into the circumstances of her presence before the
court was unnecessary. 7 Even if her arrest by an English police-
man in a foreign country violated its law and gave her a right of
action, the court reasoned that the foreign country, not England,
was the appropriate forum for such an action. 8
Yet, as commentators have noted, the court made no mention
of any international law violation.2 9 Thus, while the case is author-
ity for Justice Miller's dictum, it hardly supports extension of that
dictum to cases involving protested abductions which expressly vi-
olate international law.
R. v. Sattler,30 the second of Justice Miller's dictum authori-
ties, involved an English thief who fled to Hamburg." An English
detective located him with the help of the Hamburg police, but
arrested him without a warrant and embarked with him to Eng-
land.2 The prisoner shot the detective while their ship was on the
high seas, and the English Central Criminal Court convicted him
of murder.
3 3
On appeal, Sattler argued that the court lacked jurisdiction to
try him for murder because both his arrest and forced return were
illegal. 4 Lord Campbell, C.J., held that the question was immate-
rial." He reasoned that Sattler's act of murder on an English ves-
23. 109 Eng. Rep. 166 (K.B. 1829).
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 167.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. See GEOFF GILBERT, ASPECTS OF EXTRADITION LAW 185-86 (1991); Paul O'Higgins,
Unlawful Seizure and Irregular Extradition, 36 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 279, 282-83 (1960).
30. 169 Eng. Rep. 1111 (Q.B. 1858).
31. Id.






sel constituted revenge against the detective, not an act to obtain
his freedom, and an English statute gave the court jurisdiction to
try any person committing murder on an English ship. 6
The issue that the court addressed, however, was jurisdiction
to try Sattler for the murder after his arrest, rather than his origi-
nal felony.37 Breach of international law arising from his arrest at
Hamburg was not an issue in that case because the Hamburg po-
lice assisted with his apprehension. 8 Therefore, R. v. Sattler does
not support the extension of Ker to international law violations.
State v. Smith,39 the third of Justice Miller's authorities, in-
volved the defendant's 1829 forcible abduction from North Caro-
lina to stand trial in South Carolina. Charging that by visiting
South Carolina, he had violated the terms of an earlier pardon,4 e
the State brought Smith before the South Carolina Court of Ap-
peals to show cause why his original sentence of death should not
be carried out. Smith argued that his seizure in North Carolina by
private persons hoping to earn the South Carolina Governor's re-
ward was illegal and violated North Carolina's sovereignty. 4 While
admitting the illegality of Smith's seizure, the court decided that
any reparation due North Carolina was a political matter for the
Governor.42 The South Carolina court refused Smith's motion to
dismiss.43
Unlike Smith, State v. Brewster," the fourth of Justice
Miller's authorities, involved an international abduction.45 A party
of Vermonters forcibly removed Brewster from his home in Canada
and delivered him for trial before a Vermont court on charges of
burglary and stealing. 4' Convicted of stealing, Brewster argued
before the Vermont Supreme Court that his forced removal from
Canada barred the Vermont court's exercise of personal
36. Id.
37. See id.; O'Higgins supra, note 29, at 284.
38. See O'Higgins, supra note 29, at 284.
39. 8 S.C. (1 Bail.) 131 (S.C. Ct. App. 1829).
40. Id. at 131. A court, in 1821, had sentenced Smith to death for stealing a slave, but
the Governor pardoned him on the condition that he never return to South Carolina. Id.
41. Id. at 134.
42. Id.
43. Id. The court stated that "[tihe prisoner is an offender against our laws, and to
them he owes atonement." Id.






First, the court noted that the record failed to show whether
Canadian authorities had assented to Brewster's removal."8 The
court decided that Vermont's courts could, nevertheless, try Brew-
ster for a violation of Vermont law, since he committed the viola-
tion in Vermont and "his escape into Canada did not purge the
offence, nor oust our jurisdiction."'8
Second, even if there were any illegality in his forced removal
from Canada, the court reasoned, Canada's complaint of violation
of its sovereignty would be "a subject not within the constitutional
powers of this court."5 In short, complaints rooted in a foreign
government's sovereignty would not protect Brewster from a Ver-
mont court's exercise of jurisdiction."
The Brewster court's reasoning, however, was obiter dictum.
Brewster's abductors were private persons acting without any offi-
cial authorization, and Canada had not protested.
Pennsylvania's Chief Justice Gibson cited Brewster in Dow's
Case,"2 the fifth of Justice Miller's authorities. In Dow, the defend-
ant boarded a steamboat in Detroit. Subsequently, the steamboat's
officers arrested him without a warrant.5 3 The officers delivered the
defendant to the sheriff at Erie, Pennsylvania." The court held
that the defendant's arrest without a warrant in Michigan and sub-
sequent transport to Pennsylvania did not bar his criminal trial.55
The court noted that Michigan's governor had not demanded
Dow's release, but that, if he had, Pennsylvania would have
complied. 6
47. See id. at 120.
48. Id. at 120.
49. State v. Brewster, 7 Vt. 117, 120 (1835).
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. 18 Pa. 37 (1851).
53. Id. at 40.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 40. Dow had fled Pennsylvania under indictment, and after that state's Gov-
ernor requested his extradition from Michigan, the Governor issued a warrant for his arrest
and surrender to Pennsylvania officials. Id. at 37. Though the reporter's statement of facts
does not actually say so, it seems probable that Dow once more was fleeing arrest when he
boarded the steamboat in Detroit. See id.
56. Chief Justice Gibson wrote:
[t]he sovereignty of the state, therefore, was not outraged, unless it resided in
the prisoner's person. A sovereign state is doubtless bound to fight the battle of
its citizen, when he has his quarrel just; but it is not bound to maintain him
against demands of foreign justice from which he has fled. It may, or it may not,
1993]
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If Dow's Case provides any authority for Justice Miller's state-
ment, it certainly provides no basis for sweeping assertions of per-
sonal jurisdiction over criminal defendants, irrespective of their
mode of arrival before a court.
State v. Ross"7 supported Justice Miller even less. There, two
horse thieves appealed an Iowa court conviction. They argued that
their arrest in Missouri and forced return to Iowa by private indi-
viduals, acting without state authorization, precluded the "rightful
exercise of jurisdiction"" by the trial court. 9 The Iowa Supreme
Court disagreed. "The offense being committed in Iowa, it was
punishable here, and an indictment could have been found without
reference to the arrest." 60
The court reasoned that criminal and civil cases were distin-
guishable in their treatment of defendants illegally brought before
the courts. 1 In a civil case, the plaintiff who produced a defendant
through violence or fraud could not invoke the jurisdiction of the
court. No such action stained the court's jurisdiction when a crimi-
nal defendant was brought before a court by the illegal efforts of
volunteers.2 In dicta, the court stated that if the defendants' ille-
gal procurement had been from another country, rather than a
state "the violation of the law of the other sovereignty, so far as
entitled to weight, would be the same in principle . ... " The
court's extension of its analysis to international abductions was
dicta because the case involved a domestic abduction.
The Ship Richmond" was the last of Justice Miller's authori-
ties. There, a majority of the Supreme Court affirmed a district
court's condemnation of a ship for violating the Nonintercourse
Act of 1809.65 A U.S. gunboat had seized The Richmond in the
waters of Spanish Florida, and this act, her owners claimed, made
interpose its shield at discretion; but the exercise of this discretion will be di-
rected, not by any claim he may be supposed to have on it, but by a considera-
tion of the consequences to the general weal.
Id. at 39.
57. 21 Iowa 467 (1866).
58. Id. at 470.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 471.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. State v. Ross, 21 Iowa 467, 471-72 (1866).
64. 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 102 (1815).
65. 2 Stat. 528 (1809).
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subsequent condemnation proceedings void.6 6 The civil seizure of
the vessel in another country's jurisdiction was no doubt an of-
fense, wrote Chief Justice Marshall, but one requiring adjustment
by the two states.6 7 Thus, he concluded that the trespass did not
annul the proceedings against the vessel.6 8
This case supports Justice Miller's dictum only if one accepts
the analogy between a civil seizure, in breach of international law,
and the abduction of a person in another state by U.S. officials in
breach of international law. Had Chief Justice Marshall explained
why trespass against another nation's territorial jurisdiction lacked
any connection with the subsequent civil seizure under the district
court's process,69 The Ship Richmond would be much stronger
support for Justice Miller's dictum.
Of the seven authorities on which Justice Miller's proposition
relies, few are factually similar and all apply only after strained
interpretations. For example, only two, State v. Brewster and The
Ship Richmond, concerned abductions or seizures breaching inter-
national law. Brewster involved an unofficial cross-border appre-
hension without any Canadian demand for his return. Thus, the
court's remarks on its retention of personal jurisdiction were
purely dicta. The Ship Richmond, in contrast, presented no ratio
decidendi whatsoever for its holding. Dow's Case did not involve
an international abduction. It did, however, suggest that, were a
criminal defendant abducted and that defendant's state were to
demand his release, the court trying such a defendant would have
to release him. In short, the common law before 1886 was, at best,
a weak foundation for the Ker-Frisbie doctrine.
B. United States v. Rauscher and Ker v. Illinois: Extradition
Treaties and Personal Jurisdiction
On December 6, 1886, the U.S. Supreme Court decided two
cases concerning extradition treaties, United States v. Rauscher
7 0
and Ker v. Illinois.1 Each addressed a different question about
66. 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) at 103.
67. Id. at 104.
68. Id.
69. For criticism of this decision on other grounds see Edwin D. Dickinson, Jurisdiction
Following Seizure or Arrest in Violation of International Law, 28 AM. J. INT'L L. 231, 240-
41 (1934).
70. 119 U.S. 407 (1886).
71. 119 U.S. 436 (1886).
1993]
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these treaties' protections for criminal defendants.
Rauscher addressed the question of whether a suspected mur-
derer, surrendered by Britain at the United States' request under
the extradition article of the Webster-Ashburton Treaty of 1842,2
had a right not to be tried in a U.S. court on a charge not in the
extradition request.73 Justice Miller began by noting that commen-
tators had argued that a requesting country could only try an ex-
tradited defendant for the charge in the extradition request.7 He
argued that treaties are U.S. law, and courts must enforce individ-
ual rights arising from those treaties.7 5 In light of the treaty's pur-
pose, Justice Miller concluded that an extradited defendant must
be allowed the right to "be tried only for the offence with which he
is charged in the extradition proceedings. ' 76 He also held that the
defendant must have reasonable time to leave the country before
his prosecution on other charges.77
The Rauscher Court effectively found an implied term (the
doctrine of specialty)7 8 in that treaty. The Court held that, when
an extradition treaty is in place, an individual "can only be taken




In Ker, a private agent kidnapped a criminal defendant from
the territory of a country which had an extradition treaty with the
United States.80 Notably, the private agent presented no extradi-
tion request to that territory.81 The Court addressed the question
of whether Ker could plea in abatement to a state court's jurisdic-
tion because the kidnapping denied him due process of law and
contravened a right of asylum granted him by the extradition
treaty.2
72. Webster-Ashburton Treaty, Aug. 9, 1842, U.S.-U.K., art. X, 8 Stat. 572, 576 (1848).
73. United States v. Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407, 409-10 (1886).
74. Id. at 416-17.
75. Id. at 419.
76. Id. at 424.
77. Id. at 419-24.
78. See generally Christopher J. Morvillo, Note, Individual Rights and the Doctrine of
Specialty: The Deterioration of United States v. Rauscher, 14 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 987
(1991).
79. United States v. Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407, 421 (1886).
80. Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436, 439-41 (1886).
81. Id.
82. See id. The facts in the case were bizarre. For a fuller version than given in the
opinion, see Charles Fairman, Editorial Comment, Ker v. Illinois Revisited, 47 AM. J. INT'L
L. 678 (1953).
Frederick M. Ker fled from charges of embezzlement and larceny in Illinois to the
safety of Lima, Peru. Ker, 119 U.S. at 437-38. That city was then in the hands of a Chilean
[Vol. 25:1
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Previously, Ker had appealed his criminal conviction to the
Illinois Supreme Court. He claimed that the trial court lacked per-
sonal jurisdiction because he had not been brought before the
court by due process of law.83
Ker maintained that, when the United States had an extradi-
tion treaty with another country, the treaty secured "'due process
of law' for getting jurisdiction" '84 over criminal defendants named
in the treaty.8 5 Second, removal by force from its treaty partner's
territory, rather than by extradition request, of a fugitive accused
of a crime in the United States violated the treaty.86 Third, it also
deprived the fugitive, without due process of law, of his right to
asylum under the treaty.
8 7
The Illinois Supreme Court held, first, that Ker had no right
of asylum in Peru under the extradition treaty.8 8 Second, it held
that, even if there were a right of asylum as to crimes not named in
an extradition treaty, Ker could not have invoked asylum because
larceny was a crime specifically named in the U.S. extradition
treaty with Peru. 9 The court stated:
The accused was subject to extradition at any time under the
treaty, and what difference can it make, in law, as to the right of
a State court to try defendant for an extraditable crime, whether
the existing treaty was, in fact, observed in all its forms? That
which was done, if wrong, was in violation of international law,
and if the government of Peru does not complain of the arrest of
defendant within its jurisdiction, as an infringement of interna-
tional law, it does not lie in the mouth of defendant to make
complaint on its behalf. Questions arising under international
law concern principally the nations involved, and their settle-
expedition, a result of war between Chile and Peru. Fairman, supra, at 685. The Peruvian
government had withdrawn to Arequipa. Id. The Pinkerton agent, who had trailed Ker to
Lima on behalf of his former employers, had a U.S. request to Peru for Ker's extradition. Id.
The agent asked the Chilean commander for permission to proceed to Arequipa to deliver it.
Id. The commander, Admiral Lynch, instead sent one of his officers with the Pinkerton
Agent to apprehend Ker and place him, against his will, aboard a U.S. ship lying in Callao
harbor. Id. From there his captor and Ker proceeded, via Honolulu, to California, whose
Governor honored an Illinois requisition for his surrender. Ker, 119 U.S. at 438. Thus, there
was no delivery of the extradition request to Peru.
83. See Ker v. People, 110 111. 627, 634 (1884), affd, 119 U.S. 436 (1886).
84. Id. at 638.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 639-40.
87. Id.




ment is a national affair.90
Because the matter did not, therefore, arise under a statute or
treaty, the U.S. Supreme Court in 1886 could not review the ques-
tion of whether a criminal defendant's presence before a court as a
direct result of an international law violation deprived that court
of jurisdiction."' Its appellate jurisdiction over state courts ex-
tended only to final judgments denying rights claimed under the
U.S. Constitution, statutes, or treaties.92
Thus, the issues Ker brought on a writ of error to the U.S.
Supreme Court only concerned his abduction by a private person
in Peru and enforced transport for trial in Illinois. In short, the
U.S. Supreme Court could only decide the much narrower issue of
whether the acts of abduction and subsequent forced transport to
the United States deprived him of due process and, pursuant to an
existing extradition treaty, his right to asylum in Peru. 3
The Court read due process narrowly. It concluded that "[t]he
'due process of law' here guaranteed is complied with when the
party is regularly indicted by the proper grand jury in the State
court, has a trial according to the forms and modes prescribed for
such trials, and when, in that trial and proceedings, he is deprived
of no rights to which he is lawfully entitled." 94 Though the Consti-
tution's Fourteenth Amendment might govern some aspects of pre-
trial proceedings, the Court noted, "mere irregularities" in the
manner in which a criminal defendant was brought within the
court's custody did not preclude his trial.95
Ker's right of asylum claim96 fared no better. Ker, using the
very cases that the Court cited with approval in Rauscher, argued
90. Id. at 640. There was no necessity for the last observation because Ker's counsel,
citing Ex parte Scott, State v. Brewster, State v. Smith, Dow's Case, and State v. Ross,
with complete confidence in their due process and right of asylum claims, conceded in their
argument that aside from the treaty Ker could not maintain that the manner in which he
arrived before the court deprived it of jurisdiction. Id. at 630. Nevertheless, the court re-
turned to this point later in its opinion when it noted that if Ker's capture invaded Peru's
sovereignty, it was accomplished by private individuals rather than the U.S. government,
"precisely as was done in Ex parte Scott and The State v. Brewster." Id. at 643 (citations
omitted). Any Peruvian protest would be a matter arising under international law rather
than a U.S. statute or treaty. Id.
91. See Fairman, supra note 82, at 682.
92. Id.
93. See Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436, 439-41 (1886).
94. Id. at 440.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 441.
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that the extradition treaty created a right of asylum. Justice
Miller did not distinguish these cases in Ker, but merely repeated
the Illinois Supreme Court's argument.9 8 First, he noted that no
right of asylum for fleeing criminals appeared in the extradition
treaty's terms, nor did the treaty imply such a right.9 Peru could
have surrendered or expelled Ker at any time, and the treaty
merely limited that country's right to offer him or any other crimi-
nal fugitive asylum when its treaty partner demanded his surren-
der under the treaty. 100 Peru had the right to offer asylum, but the
treaty afforded Ker no right to demand it. 1°0
Furthermore, because the Pinkerton agent never presented the
extradition request to the Peruvian government, or claimed to be
acting under the treaty when he kidnapped Ker, the Court stated
that Ker's apprehension "was a clear case of kidnapping within the
dominions of Peru, without any pretense of authority under the
treaty or from the government of the United States.' 0 2 Thus, he
arrived before the Illinois courts "clothed with no rights which a
proceeding under the treaty could have given him, and no duty
which this country owes to Peru or to him under the treaty.
103
Next, the Court addressed the question of whether Ker's arri-
val before Illinois' courts by means of abduction in another coun-
try impaired the state courts' jurisdiction. The Court concluded
that was an issue of common or international law, and one for the
respective state courts' decision.'0 4
Perhaps regrettably, Justice Miller chose not to conclude his
opinion at this point. ,Instead, he added, "[t]here are authorities of
the highest respectability which hold that such forcible abduction
is no sufficient reason why the party should not answer when
brought within the jurisdiction of the court which has the right to
try him for such an offense, and presents no valid objection to his
97. See Fairman, supra note 82, at 680-81; see also United States v. Rauscher, 119 U.S.
407, 427-29 (1886) (citing Commonwealth v. Hawes, 13 Bush 697 (Ky. 1878); Blandford v.
State, 10 Tex. Crim. 627 (Crim. App. 1881); State v. Vanderpool, 39 Ohio St. 273 (1883)).
98. Compare Ker v. People, 110 Ill. 627, 640-42 (1884), with Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S.
436, 442-43 (1886).
99. Ker, 119 U.S. at 442.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 443.
103. Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436, 443 (1886).
104. Id. at 444.
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trial in such court. 10 5
That this was dictum and that the "authorities of the highest
respectability" supported no more than private, unofficial abduc-
tions like Ker's have mattered little. Nor has the Justice's immedi-
ate qualification, "[aind though we might or might not differ with
the Illinois court on that subject, it is one in which we have no
right to review their decision."10 6 Ker now stands for a rule on an
issue which its author expressly declined to decide.
Ker v. Illinois most accurately stands for the proposition that
a criminal defendant's abduction from the territory of another na-
tion by private individuals, acting without official authorization
and independent of any extradition treaty, does not deprive the
defendant of due process of law or any rights under an extradition
treaty. Thus, that kind of an abduction does not bar the Court's
exercise of personal jurisdiction. The Court's dictum merely added
that there was common law authority that "such forcible abduc-
tion" did not otherwise preclude the exercise of jurisdiction.
Plainly, the Court addressed an unofficial abduction in Ker, in re-
sponse to which Peru neither protested nor demanded Ker's
restitution.
C. The Supreme Court's Invocation of Ker After 1886
Between 1886 and 1992, the Supreme Court invoked Ker v.
Illinois in cases involving criminal defendants who attempted,
through claims that their presence before those courts resulted
from illegalities, to challenge the trial courts' jurisdiction.' Each
case involved a claimed domestic illegality. And in each case, the
Court invoked Ker to defeat a criminal defendant's contention that
the exercise of personal jurisdiction denied him due process of law
or other constitutional rights. Thus the Court always reached the
Ker doctrine through the constitutional framework constructed by
Justice Miller.
105. Id.
106. Ker, 119 U.S. at 444; see Andreas F. Lowenfeld, U.S. Law Enforcement Abroad:
The Constitution and International Law Continued, 84 AM. J. INT'L L. 444, 464 (1990) (not-
ing that Justice Miller himself may have doubted the justice of this result for Ker).
107. See United States v. Crews, 445 U.S. 463, 474 (1980); Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S.
103, 119 (1975); Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519, 522 (1952); Pettibone v. Nichols, 203 U.S.
192, 207 (1906); In re Johnson, 167 U.S. 120, 126 (1897); Lascelles v. Georgia, 148 U.S. 537,




Probably because they involve no international issues, these
cases have received little attention from the Ker-Frisbie doctrine's
critics. Even Frisbie v. Collins'"5 receives little more than dismis-
sal, with a note that it reinforced Ker and contributed the doc-
trine's second appellation.'"9
Precisely because they demonstrate that Ker-Frisbie has been
a doctrine of narrow constitutional or "internal" use, some of these
cases warrant brief examination. Frisbie, in addition to containing
the most ringing endorsement of Ker, challenges the thesis that
the Ker-Frisbie doctrine cannot extend to international law
violations.
1. Domestic Cases
Two years after Ker, the Supreme Court decided a case in-
volving a criminal defendant's abduction from West Virginia and
forced return to Kentucky to stand trial for murder.110 The Ken-
tucky armed posse's invasion prompted West Virginia's demand
for the prisoner's release and return."1 Kentucky refused, on the
grounds that the matters involved were judicial, rather than execu-
tive."' After granting a writ of habeas corpus and conducting a
hearing, the federal district court denied the defendant's motion
for discharge."' The Circuit Court affirmed, and West Virginia ap-
108. 342 U.S. 519 (1952).
109. See, e.g., Abraham Abramovsky, Extraterritorial Abductions: America's "Catch
and Snatch" Policy Run Amok, 31 VA. J. INT'L L. 151, 157-58 (1990) ("Although bereft of
any basis either in international law or domestic precedent, the holding in Ker, buttressed
by the interstate case of Frisbie v. Collins, has incredibly attained the status of a judicially
sanctioned doctrine which recognizes jurisdiction over a defendant before the court regard-
less of how his presence was obtained.") (citations omitted); Lowenfeld, supra note 106, at
464-65 ("I have dwelt on Ker v. Illinois in so much detail because it is the only Supreme
Court case, so far as I am aware, that addresses abduction abroad, and because the other
pillar of the 'Ker-Frisbie' rule arose out of a purely domestic incident and is thus not really
relevant to the subject of this article-law enforcement by U.S. officers abroad.") (citations
omitted).
110. Mahon v. Justice, 127 U.S. 700, 700 (1888). The Governor of Kentucky requested
extradition, but the Governor of West Virginia was still pondering the requisition when the
posse captured Mahon. Id.
111. Id. at 701.
112. Id. West Virginia's Governor applied, in federal court, for a writ of habeas corpus,
"in alleged vindication of the rights of the State of West Virginia, and of every citizen
thereof, and especially of the said Plyant Mahon thus confined and deprived of his liberty,
to the end that due process of law secured by both the Constitution of the United States
and the constitution of the State of West Virginia, and the laws made in pursuance thereof,




pealed to the Supreme Court. 1'
The U.S. Supreme Court framed the issue before it as:
"whether a person indicted for a felony in one State, forcibly
abducted from another State and brought to the State where he
was indicted by parties acting without warrant or authority of
law, is entitled under the Constitution or laws of the United
States to release from detention under the indictment by reason
of such forcible and unlawful abduction."'
' 5
The Court found that Kentucky's detention of Mahon did not vio-
late the Fourteenth Amendment." 6 It reasoned that Kentucky had
not authorized his unlawful abduction.1 17 Therefore, Kentucky's
detention of Mahon for trial denied him no right. 1" 8 Further, be-
cause Article Four of the Constitution decreed that a person
charged in one state with a crime who fled to another must be re-
turned on the demand of the state from which he fled, Mahon had
no right of asylum in West Virginia." 9 In short, that he had been
removed from West Virginia by unlawful means was irrelevant to
the Kentucky court's jurisdiction to try him for violating its law. 20
The Court held that Mahon's arrest in Kentucky and deten-
tion before trial deprived him of no rights guaranteed by the Con-
stitution or U.S. laws.' 2 ' The Court relied on Ex parte Scott,
22
State v. Smith, 23 State v. Brewster,'24 State v. Ross, 25 and Ker v.
Illinois12 6 to support its holding.
2 7
Justice Field, the opinion's author, noted that the Constitu-
tion limited individual states' sovereignty by preventing, among
other actions, reprisals against other states for invasions such as
the one which plucked Mahon from his refuge in West Virginia. 28
114. Id. at 704.
115. Id. at 706.
116. Mahon v. Justice, 127 U.S. 700, 707 (1888).
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 707-08; U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 2.
120. Mahon, 127 U.S. at 708.
121. Id. at 715.
122. 109 Eng. Rep. 166 (K.B. 1829).
123. 8 S.C. (1 Bail.) 131 (S.C. Ct. App. 1829).
124. 7 Vt. 117 (1835).
125. 21 Iowa 467 (1866).
126. 119 U.S. 436 (1886).
127. Mahon v. Justice, 127 U.S. 700, 708-15 (1888). See supra text accompanying notes
19-109 for a discussion of these cases.
128. Mahon, 127 U.S. at 705.
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In a passage illustrative of international law in 1887, he contrasted
the right of completely sovereign states to respond to such injury:
If the States of the Union were possessed of an absolute sover-
eignty, instead of a limited one, they could demand of each
other reparation for an unlawful invasion of their territory and
the surrender of the parties abducted, and of parties committing
the offence, and in case of refusal to comply with the demand,
could resort to reprisals, or take any other measures they might
deem necessary as redress for the past and security for the
future."2 9
Mahon v. Justice not only demonstrates the application of the
Ker doctrine to due process issues, but also states the rule of cus-
tomary international law which would apply to international non-
consensual kidnappings. If a nation demanded the return of a per-
son kidnapped and forcibly removed from its territory for trial in
another country, international law required the person's restitu-
tion. Failure to return him justified reprisals for the breach of law.
In Lascelles v. Georgia,'"0 a criminal defendant maintained
that his trial in Georgia's courts violated his due process rights. 1 '
He argued that trial for an offense other than that for which an-
other state had extradited him deprived him of a right guaranteed
by the Constitution and laws of the United States.' Relying on
the rule announced in Rauscher,'3 he argued that the Constitution
and U.S. statutes required that a state seeking the return of a per-
son for a violation of its laws from another state have actually
charged the fugitive with a crime. 3 4 Thus, by implication, he rea-
soned that the law conferred on him a right to be tried only for the
crime listed on Georgia's extradition requisition.3 5
This might be the case were the states independent sovereign-
ties, the Court said, but nothing in the Constitution constituted a
pact limiting the rights of states to try fugitives extradited by
other states to particular offenses.'3 6 The Court doubted whether
the Constitution even permitted states to make pacts limiting sur-
renders to particular offenses, and even if they could do this,
129. Id. at 704-05.
130. 148 U.S. 537 (1893).
131. Id. at 540.
132. Id.
133. United States v. Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407 (1886).
134. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2.
135. Lascelles, 148 U.S. at 541.
136. Id. at 542-43.
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it is settled by the decisions of this court that, except in the case
of a fugitive surrendered by a foreign government, there is noth-
ing in the Constitution, treaties or laws of the United States
which exempts an offender, brought before the courts of a State
for an offence against its laws, from trial and punishment, even
though brought from another State by unlawful violence, or by
abuse of legal process."'7
Thus, plainly the Court found Ker useful in defeating exorbi-
tant claims to constitutional rights and in correcting the misappli-
cation of the doctrine of specialty.
Frisbie v. Collins138 has great significance for the applicability
of the Ker doctrine to U.S. violations of international law. Here,
the Court faced more than the usual argument that a deprivation
of due process precluded exercise of a court's jurisdiction to try a
criminal defendant. A Michigan court convicted Collins of murder
and sentenced him to life imprisonment. 13 9 Collins sought a writ of
habeas corpus in federal district court.140 He claimed that his kid-
napping in Chicago by Michigan police, forced return to Michigan,
and subsequent trial there denied his right to due process and vio-
lated the Federal Kidnapping Act."4 Although the district court,
relying on the Ker rule, denied the writ, the court of appeals re-
versed and remanded on the ground that violation of the Kidnap-
ping Act by the Michigan police barred that state court's exercise
of jurisdiction over the person kidnapped. 1 2 Any other conclusion,
it argued, would encourage law enforcement officers to commit
crimes themselves.
14 3
The Supreme Court reversed. Noting that Congress in the
Federal Kidnapping Act imposed harsh punishment for its viola-
tors, the Court reasoned that courts could not construe the Act to
include as another sanction, "barring a state from prosecuting per-
sons wrongfully brought to it by its officers. 14 4 With the Federal
Kidnapping Act thus dispatched and the remaining issue merely
137. Id. at 543 (citing Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436, 444 (1886); Mahon v. Justice, 127
U.S. 700, 707, 708, 712, 715 (1888); Cook v. Hart, 146 U.S. 183, 190, 192 (1892)).
138. 342 U.S. 519 (1952).
139. Id. at 519-20.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 520. Federal Kidnapping Act, 47 Stat. 326 (1932) (codified as amended at 18
U.S.C. § 1201 (Supp. III 1991)).
142. Frisbie, 342 U.S. at 520, 522.
143. Id. at 522.
144. Id. at 523.
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one of due process deprivation, the Court could reaffirm the Ker
rule.
This Court has never departed from the rule announced in Ker
v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436, 444, that the power of a court to try a
person for crime is not impaired by the fact that he had been
brought within the court's jurisdiction by reason of a "forcible
abduction." No persuasive reasons are now presented to justify
overruling this line of cases. They rest on the sound basis that
due process of law is satisfied when one present in court is con-
victed of a crime after having been fairly apprized of the charges
against him and after a fair trial in accordance with constitu-
tional procedural safeguards. There is nothing in the Constitu-
tion that requires a court to permit a guilty person rightfully
convicted to escape justice because he was brought to trial
against his will.145
This well-known reaffirmation of Ker, because it merely con-
firms the Ker doctrine, is not the aspect of Frisbie which concerns
the doctrine's extension to international law violations. Rather, it
is the Court's holding that a violation of a U.S. statute in bringing
a criminal defendant before a court does not bar its exercise of
jurisdiction.
Expansionist Ker followers may argue that, if a violation of a
federal statute does not bar jurisdiction, neither should a violation
of international law.14 6 One response to this argument is that the
Federal Kidnapping Act already includes specific sanctions for its
breach, but does not mandate the kidnapped person's restitution
to the injured state. The remedy in international law when one
country's law enforcement agents kidnap a person from another
country without its permission is the person's return. 147 Therefore,
the Frisbie Court could ignore the personal jurisdiction argument
and apply the statutory sanctions. However, a court faced with an
international abduction and no statutory sanctions should apply
the international remedy of returning the kidnapped person.
After 1952, the Court invoked the Ker-Frisbie doctrine in two
145. Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 514, 522 (1952) (citations omitted).
146. Since The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900), international law is U.S. law
on a par with, but hardly superior to, statutes. For the argument that a unilateral abduction
by one state of a person charged with violating its laws from the territory of another state
without its consent is a breach of international law see infra text accompanying notes 189-
229.
147. See infra text accompanying notes 230 & 231.
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more due process cases involving purely domestic situations.4 8
Neither domestic case supports the doctrine's extension to U.S. in-
ternational law violations. Thus, the Court's lack of an occasion to
apply Justice Miller's dictum to an international law violation, un-
til Alvarez-Machain, does not conclusively establish that Ker-Fris-
bie is an exclusively domestic doctrine. Nevertheless, the Court has
declined to apply the Ker-Frisbie doctrine in two cases involving
questions of international law.
2. International Cases
Forty years after it decided Rauscher 19 and Ker,6 0 the
Supreme Court again encountered a case involving the extraterri-
torial implications of male captus, bene detentus. In Ford v.
United States,'6 ' it explained why the Ker doctrine had no appli-
cability to a U.S. treaty's contravention. Only five years later, the
Court observed that, when the United States limited its territorial
authority by treaty, it precluded its courts' exercise of jurisdiction
over persons seized in violation of that treaty limitation. 51
In the 1920s, the United States, engaged in a "War on Alco-
hol" arising from the Eighteenth Amendment,153 began searching
and seizing British vessels hovering off U.S. coasts beyond the
three-mile territorial limit." Britain, not burdened by prohibition,
rejected a U.S. proposal for a treaty allowing both countries to
search and seize hovering vessels beyond their three-mile limits.
The U.S. Supreme Court then held in Cunard Steamship Co. v.
Mellon 155 that U.S. prohibition laws applied to foreign vessels in
U.S. territorial waters."6 ' British liners plying the New York-
Southampton route had to sail dry from New York and jettison
their liquor stores at our three-mile line on arrival from Eng-
land.157 Now motivated to reach an accommodation with the
148. United States v. Crews, 445 U.S. 463, 474 (1980); Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103,
119 (1975).
149. United States v. Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407 (1886).
150. Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436 (1886).
151. 273 U.S. 593 (1927).
152. Cook v. United States, 288 U.S. 102, 121-22 (1933).
153. U.S. CONST. amend. XVIII, repealed by U.S. CONST. amend. XXI.
154. See Cook, 288 U.S. at 112-16.
155. 262 U.S. 100 (1923).
156. Id.
157. See Cook v. United States, 288 U.S. 102, 112-16 (1933). For a more positive view of
the Court's role in adjusting this transnational temperance tension see United States v. Al-
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United States, Britain agreed to a treaty.
158
The defendants in Ford were captured with their vessel off
San Francisco. On appeal, they argued that the trial court erred by
not sending to the jury the question of whether their vessel had
been within the treaty limit when captured.15 9 When the govern-
ment maintained that under Ker even a seizure contravening the
treaty would not impair the trial court's jurisdiction, Chief Justice
Taft announced that Ker simply did not apply.
1 e0
He reasoned that Ker held that trial by a state court of a de-
fendant illegally brought before it was not a federal question be-
cause it did not violate the Constitution, any federal law, or a U.S.
treaty, while Ford certainly involved a treaty. 61 The issue of
whether the seizure contravened the treaty had no bearing on the
defendants' innocence or guilt, but it "affected the right of the
court to hold their persons for trial."1 2 He did not elaborate on
this statement. Instead, Chief Justice Taft held that the defend-
ants should have raised the issue of the treaty's contravention in a
plea to the trial court's jurisdiction, and their failure to file such a
plea waived the question on appeal.1 63 The Court then affirmed the
lower courts on other grounds. This decision, in addition to the
rule of Rauscher, was yet another indication that the Court did not
wish to extend Ker.1
6 4
Cook v. United States1 65 further confirmed the theory that in-
ternational law violations stood outside the scope of male captus,
bene detentus. In Cook, the Coast Guard boarded and seized a Ca-
nadian vessel, The Mazel Tov, loaded with liquor beyond the limit
set by the treaty with Britain."'
Cook, the ship's master, successfully argued in the trial court
varez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. 2188, 2196 n.16 (1992).
158. See Cook, 288 U.S. at 117-18; Ford v. United States, 273 U.S. 593, 607-08 (1927)
(reprinting the relevant treaty provisions). The treaty allowed passenger vessels to carry
sealed liquor through our territorial waters and gave the United States the right to search
and seize vessels supplying liquor outside the three mile limit, but not beyond one hour's
steaming from the actual coast. Ford, 273 U.S. at 607-08.
159. Ford, 273 U.S. at 605.
160. Id. at 605-06.
161. Id. at 606.
162. Id.
163. Ford v. United States, 273 U.S. 593, 606 (1927).
164. See United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 939 F.2d 1341, 1346 (9th Cir. 1991), va-
cated and remanded, 112 S. Ct. 2986 (1992).
165. 288 U.S. 102 (1933).
166. Id. at 107, 110-12.
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that the treaty's provisions superseded the customs statute's grant
of authority to the Coast Guard to board and search vessels within
four miles of the coast, that the seizure was illegal and, therefore,
that the court lacked jurisdiction. 167 The government argued that,
even if the initial Coast Guard stop and seizure were illegal as a
treaty violation, the subsequent Customs filing of a libel for forfei-
ture ratified the illegal seizure and removed any bar to the trial
court's jurisdiction. 68
The Supreme Court disagreed. There certainly was a rule that
if the government illegally seized property, but subsequently filed
a libel of forfeiture, the seizure could be ratified."6 9 However, this
was not such a case. The government itself, not merely the Coast
Guard, had given up its power to seize in the treaty.170 The United
States explicitly gave up its power to seize, so the Court reasoned;
therefore, it must have given up its power to adjudicate after a
seizure because to adjudicate after such a seizure would defeat the
treaty's purpose.17 ' The Court distinguished The Ship Rich-
mond 7 2 and a subsequent case. Those cases, the Court reasoned,
involved seizures of U.S. owned ships in which no treaty was vio-
lated, just "the law of nations. 173 The Court in each had merely
held that the illegal seizure did not invalidate the trial court's pro-
cess or the action's venue;1'7 neither case, the Cook Court rea-
soned, turned on treaty violations.
.This was an invalid distinction. Customary international law
and treaty law have equal force within the United States. 7 5 It fol-
lows that seizures violating "the law of nations" would be just as
illegal as those violating treaties.
167. Id. at 108.
168. Id. at120-21. The issue is similar to The Ship Richmond, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 102
(1815). See supra text accompanying notes 64-68.
169. See Cook, 288 U.S. at 121.
170. Id. at 121.
171. Cook v. United States, 288 U.S. 102, 121-22 (1933).
172. 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 102 (1815).
173. Cook, 288 U.S. at 122.
174. Id.
175. See Dickinson, supra note 69, at 241 (arguing that seizures violating customary
international law are just as illegal as those violating treaties, stoutly maintaining that The
Ship Richmond was "wrong in principle," and that Cook had in effect overruled it); see also
infra discussion accompanying notes 232-42.
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D. Ker-Frisbie in the Lower Federal Courts
A complete account of the lower federal courts' use of the Ker
doctrine is beyond this Article's scope. 17  Apart from United
States v. Verdugo-Urquidez'7 and United States v. Alvarez-
Machain,'7 8 no other cases have involved abductions by U.S. gov-
ernment officials or agents from the territory of the country which
has specifically demanded the abducted person's return.' 79 One
lower court, however, tried to create an exception to Ker-Frisbie's
actual doctrine that an illegal kidnapping does not deprive its vic-
tim of due process. In United States v. Toscanino,'s0 a criminal
defendant alleged that U.S. agents abducted him from Uruguay,
tortured him, and interrogated him for seventeen days in Brazil,
before forcing him onto a flight to New York.18' Maintaining that
the Supreme Court's constitutional decisions since Frisbie had ex-
176. For a summary listing of cases in which defendants claimed to have been brought
before the courts illegally, see Chermside Jr., supra note 13, at 689-90.
177. 939 F.2d 1341, 1344 (9th Cir. 1991), vacated and remanded, 112 S. Ct. 2986 (1992).
For discussion of Verdugo-Urquidez, see generally Thomas L. Horan, Recent Development,
21 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 525 (1990); Wilson G. Jones, Note, The Ninth Circuit's
Camarena Decisions: Exceptions or Aberrations of the Ker-Frisbie Doctrine, 27 TEx. INrr'L
L.J. 211 (1992); Mark L. LaBollita, Note, The Extraterritorial Rights of Nonresident
Aliens: An Alternative Theoretical Approach, 12 B.U. THIRD WORLD L.J. 363 (1992); Mindy
Ann Oppenheim, Comment, United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez: Hands Across the Bor-
der-the Long Reach of United States Agents Abroad, and the Short Reach of the Fourth
Amendment, 17 BROOK. L. REV. 617 (1991).
178. For a discussion of Alvarez-Machain, see generally Abramovsky, supra note 109,
at 165-76; Jonathan A. Bush, How Did We Get Here? Foreign Abduction After Alvarez-
Machain, 45 STAN. L. REV. 939 (1993); John R. Hitt, United States v. Alvarez-Machain:
United States Supreme Court Ratifies Government-Sanctioned Kidnappings, 1993 DaT.
C.L. REV. 193; John Quigley, Our Men in Gudalajara and the Abduction of Suspects
Abroad: A Comment on United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 68 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 723
(1992); Steven M. Schneebaum, The Supreme Court Sanctions Transborder Kidnapping in
United States v. Alvarez-Machain: Does International Law Still Matter?, 18 BROOK. J. INT'L
L. 303; Candace R. Somers, United States v. Alvarez-Machain: Extradition and the Right to
Abduct, 18 N.C. J. INT'L & COM. REG.-213 (1992); Stephen M. Welsh, United States v. Alva-
rez-Machain, The Implications of International Abductions by the United States, 44 MER-
CER L. REV. 1023 (1993); Aimee Lee, Comment, United States v. Alvarez-Machain: The Del-
eterious Ramifications of Illegal Abductions, 17 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 126 (1993); Andrew L.
Wilder, Casenote, 32 VA. J. INT'L L. 979 (1992).
179. See United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 939 F.2d 1341, 1353 n.12 (9th Cir. 1991)
(listing all cases upholding jurisdiction over defendants claiming an illegal extraterritorial
kidnapping barred jurisdiction and showing that in all cases either the foreign nations gave
permission for the abductions (in some cases they actively participated) or acquiesced by
failing to protest), vacated and remanded, 112 S. Ct. 2986 (1992).
180. 500 F.2d 267 (2d Cir. 1974).
181. Id. at 270. The torture allegedly included pinching his fingers with metal pliers,
flushing alcohol into his eyes and nose, and electric shocks to his genitals, ears, and toes. Id.
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panded the concept of due process to include police misconduct,
the court of appeals remanded the case for an evidentiary hearing
on Toscanino's torture and other illegal conduct claims.1"'
Despite continuing respect from commentators, 183 the judici-
ary did not embrace the "Toscanino Exception." The same court
which produced it quickly limited it to cases involving kidnappings
accompanied by torture so vile as to shock the judicial con-
science. Since Toscanino, no U.S. court has applied that excep-
tion to divest jurisdiction.' 85 However, unlike violations of interna-
tional law, the "Toscanino Exception" represents an actual
exception to the Ker-Frisbie doctrine because it is rooted in due
process- 86 the doctrinal bedrock of Ker-Frisbie.
Some lower courts have implicitly acknowledged that Ker-
Frisbie does not extend to violations of international law. For ex-
ample, two cases from the Prohibition era, following the reasoning
in Ford, sustained defendants' claims that seizure of their British-
owned ships at distances greater than one hour's steaming from
the United States' coast contravened its treaty with Britain and
barred exercise of jurisdiction. 8 7 Others, in dicta, have implied
that Ker-Frisbie would not apply had the victim's country, where
abduction took place, protested.' 8
182. Id. at 272-76, 281.
183. See, e.g., GILBERT, supra note 29, at 191-92; Lowenfeld, supra note 106, at 467-72;
F.A. Mann, Reflections on the Prosecution of Persons Abducted in Breach of International
Law, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AT A TiME OF PERPLEXrry 407, 416-19 (Yoram Dinstein ed.,
1989).
184. See United States ex rel. Lujan v. Gengler, 510 F.2d 62, 65-66 (2d Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 421 U.S. 1001 (1975).
185. Abramovsky, supra note 109, at 159. In 1991, however, a South African Court of
Appeals invoked Toscanino. That court held that South Africa's courts lacked jurisdiction
to try a member of the African National Congress abducted by South African agents from
Swaziland. See State v. Ebrahim, 1991(2) SA 553, 582-84 (S. Afr. Ct. App.), translated in 31
I.L.M. 888, 896-99 (1992).
In 4lvarez-Machain, the dissent noted Ebrahim as evidence of the influence of U.S.
Supreme Court decisions on other nations' jurisprudence. United States v. Alvarez-Machain,
112 S. Ct. 2188, 2206 (1992).
186. See supra note 18.
187. See United States v. Ferris, 19 F.2d 925 (N.D. Cal. 1927); United States v. Schou-
weiler, 19 F.2d 387 (S.D. Cal. 1927).
188. See United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 939 F.2d 1341, 1349 n.9 (9th Cir. 1991)
(citing Matta-Ballesteros v. Henman, 896 F.2d 255, 260 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct.
209 (1990); United States v. Zabeneh, 837 F.2d 1249, 1261 (5th Cir. 1988); United States v.
Reed, 639 F.2d 896, 902 (2d Cir. 1981); United States v. Cordero, 668 F.2d 32, 37 (1st Cir.
1981); Waits v. McGowan, 516 F.2d 203, 208 n.9 (3d Cir. 1975)), vacated and remanded, 112
S. Ct. 2986 (1992).
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Thus, for international law violations, the Ker-Frisbie doctrine
rests on dicta. But its base is not merely the doubtful authority of
dicta in obscure common law cases. It also flows from dictum in
the seminal case, Ker v. Illinois. Since Ker, the Supreme Court has
only applied that case to defeat due process claims of domestic de-
fendants, claiming a lack of personal jurisdiction because of their
illegal mode of arrival before a trial court. In short, the Supreme
Court has applied Ker-Frisbie solely to cases involving domestic
criminal defendants and held Ker-Frisbie inapplicable to the only
two cases involving international law.
III. CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW AND OFFICIAL
EXTRATERRITORIAL ABDUCTIONS
This Part argues that official, extraterritorial abductions vio-
late customary international law. Second, it maintains that this
same law requires the return of the abducted person upon the de-
mand of the nation from whose territory the abduction occurred.
Third, it argues that the existence of an international law rule of
male captus, bene detentus, preserving the jurisdiction of an ab-
ducting nation's courts over a criminal whose abduction violated
international law, is doubtful. Further, the U.S. Congress has rec-
ognized the highly questionable underpinnings of such a rule.
Thus, without exception, a U.S. court's exercise of personal juris-
diction over a criminal defendant whose presence before it results
from such an official abduction, in another nation's territory, with-
out its consent, followed by that nation's demand for the abducted
person's return, violates international law.
A. Official Extraterritorial Abductions Violate International
Law
International rules of law have three sources: treaties, custom-
ary law, and general principles of law recognized by the world's
nations.189 Customary international law, in contrast to treaty law,
is derived from international customs evincing general- practice ac-
cepted as law.1 90 Customary international law comprises a set of
189. Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38(1), 59 Stat. 1055, 1060 (1945);
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 102(1)
(1987) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT].
190. See Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38(1)(b), 59 Stat. 1055, 1060
(1945). The Restatement defines customary international law as law that "results from a
1993]
INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 25:1
normative expectations, largely shaped and revealed by state prac-
tice in response to international incidents.'91
A primary rule arising from past state practice is that one
state may not carry out official acts in another state's territory
without permission. Each state's sovereignty over its own territory
is exclusive and absolute.'92 This rule necessarily includes official
law enforcement activities of one state in another.9 " Thus, an ab-
duction by one country's agents of a person within the territory of
another country, without that other country's consent, violates cus-
tomary international law.' 9"
general and consistent practice of states followed by them from a sense of legal obligation."
RESTATEMENT, supra note 189, § 102(1).
191. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 189, § 102(2); W. Michael Reisman, International
Incidents: Introduction to a New Genre in the Study of International Law, 10 YALE J.
INT'L L. 1 (1984).
192. See U.N. CHARTER art. 2, $ 4; CHARTER OF THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES
art. 20; RESTATEMENT, supra note 189, § 432(2) ("A state's law enforcement officials may
exercise their functions in the territory of another state only with the consent of the other
state, given by duly authorized officials of that state."); The Schooner Exchange v. McFad-
don, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 136 (1812); S.S. Lotus (Turk. v. Fr.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No.
10, at 18 (Sept. 7).
The United States has specifically assented to this principle in the context of efforts to
halt narcotics trafficking. See, e.g., Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and
Psychotropic Substances, entered into force Nov. 11, 1990, art. 2(2), (3), 28 I.L.M. 493
(1989).
193. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 189, § 432(2).
194. See United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 939 F.2d 1341, 1352 (9th Cir. 1991), va-
cated and remanded, 112 S. Ct 2986 (1992); United States ex rel. Lujan v. Gengler, 510 F.2d
62, 68 (2d Cir. 1975); United States v. Toscanino, 500 F.2d 267, 277-78 (2d Cir. 1974); Collier
v. Vaccaro, 51 F.2d 17, 19 (4th Cir. 1931); see also RESTATEMENT, supra note 189, § 432,
cmt. c; 1 L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 295 n.1 (H. Lauterpacht ed., 8th ed. 1955);
Harvard Research in International Law, Draft Convention on Jurisdiction with Respect to
Crime, art. 16, in 29 AM. J. INT'L L. 439, 442 (Supp. 1935); Michael J. Glennon, Comment,
State-Sponsored Abduction: A Comment on United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 86 AM. J.
INT'L L. 746, 746-47 (1992).
If the United States carries out such an abduction its action also violates treaties to
which it is a party. See, e.g., U.N. CHARTER art. 2, 4; CHARTER OF THE ORGANIZATION OF
AMERICAN STATES art. 17. In the ilvarez-Machain and Verdugo-Urquidez abductions, the
United States contravened the spirit, if not the letter of two agreements it had made with
Mexico on mutual criminal legal cooperation. See Agreement on Cooperation in Combatting
Narcotics Trafficking and Drug Dependency, Feb. 23, 1989, U.S.-Mex., art. 1, $ 3, 29 I.L.M.
58, 59 (1990) ("This Agreement does not empower one Party's authorities to undertake, in
the territorial jurisdiction of the other, the exercise and performance of the functions or
authority exclusively entrusted to the authorities of that other party by its national laws or
regulations."); Mutual Legal Assistance Cooperation Treaty, art. 1 $ 2, S. TREATY Doc. No.
13, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, reprinted in 27 I.L.M. 443, 446 (1988). These treaties are them-
selves evidence of customary international law. See R.R. Baxter, Treaties and Custom, 129
Recueil des Cours d'Academie de Droit International 25, 99-101 (1970).
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1. United States Practice which Illustrates a Norm Against
Abductions
The United States, through state practice, has recognized the
existence of a norm against transboundary abduction. 195 In the
first decade of the nineteenth century, the United States often
found itself in the position of injured nation. Britain regularly
stopped U.S. ships on the high seas and removed alien and U.S.
sailors, claiming that they were British deserters. 196 In a famous
1807 incident, for example, the Royal Navy's frigate Leopard at-
tacked the U.S.S. Chesapeake, searched the U.S. ship for British
deserters, and captured several crewmen. 97 When the United
States protested and demanded their return, Britain agreed to re-
turn the crew members and to pay damages to the Chesapeake's
crew wounded in the fray.
198
In 1841, a party of British troops broke into a house in
Vermont, seized a man, and carried him back to a Canadian mili-
195. For international examples see RESTATEMENT, supra note 189, § 432 reporters'
note 3; M. Cherif Bassiouni, Unlawful Seizures and Irregular Rendition Devices as Alter-
natives to Extradition, 7 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 25, 60-61 (1973). Two international exam-
ples are Attorney General of Israel v. Eichmann and In re Argoud.
Attorney General of Israel v. Eichmann, 36 I.L.R. 5 (D. Ct. Jerusalem 1961), afl'd, 36
I.L.R. 277 (Sup. Ct. Israel 1962) is the most celebrated twentieth-century transborder-ab-
duction case. Israeli agents abducted Nazi war criminal Adolf Eichmann from Argentina,
and Argentina initially protested. However, Argentina withdrew its protest before Eichmann
was brought to trial. The Israeli court deemed Argentina's withdrawal of its protest to be
essential in sustaining its jurisdiction over Eichmann. Eichmann, 36 I.L.R. at 70-71.
Prior to Argentina's withdrawal of its objection, the United Nations Security Council
declared that Israel's actions "violated the sovereignty of a Member State and were incom-
patible with the Charter of the United Nations." U.N. SCOR, 15th Sess., 868th mtg. at 35,
U.N. Doc. S/4349 (1960). In addition, the Security Council asked Israel "to make appropri-
ate reparation in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the rules of inter-
national law." Id. The two countries' Joint Communique of August 3, 1960 resolved the
incident by acknowledging that Israel's actions infringed on Argentine sovereignty, and by
acknowledging the Security Council resolution. Eichmann, 36 I.L.R. at 58-59. Nevertheless,
Argentina allowed Israel to retain custody of and jurisdiction over Eichmann. Id.
In re Argoud involved a defendant abducted in Munich and taken to France. Judgment
of June 4, 1964, Cass. crim., 45 I.L.R. 90 (Fr.). The case is significant because the French
court expressly stated that Argoud's abduction violated the rights and sovereignty of the
Federal Republic of Germany. Id. at 97. Despite this violation, the French court did not
dismiss the prosecution, id. at 98, because the German government had not yet demanded
the defendant's return. Id. at 94; see also Mann, supra note 183, at 413.
196. See O'Higgins, supra note 29, at 294 n.1. For the public's resentment of this prac-
tice and details of the return of a seaman claiming U.S. citizenship, under the extradition
clause of the Jay Treaty with Britain of 1794, see United States v. Robbins, 27 F. Cas. 825
(D.S.C. 1799).
197. See O'Higgins, supra note 29, at 293-94.
198. Id. at 294.
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tary jail.199 After the United States protested and demanded the
captive's return, the British government ordered his release. 00
This was a minor fracas compared to the Trent Affair during
the U.S. Civil War. On November 8, 1861, the U.S.S. San Jacinto
fired a shot across the bow of the Royal mail steamer Trent in the
Bahama Channel off Cuba.2 °1 After stopping the Trent, the crew of
the San Jacinto removed the Commissioners of the Confederate
States to France and England, who were travelling on board.20
Had the Commissioner's release depended on the U.S. House of
Representatives, which unanimously, with applause, passed resolu-
tions requesting the President to confine the Commissioners in
felons' cells, the two would not have been freed.2 °3 When, however,
the British government demanded the delivery of the two men, the
U.S. government delivered them.20 4
Again, in 1872, the United States, in response to a British de-
mand, returned a doctor to Canada, who had been kidnapped in
Ontario by a U.S. detective and a Canadian official, for trial in
South Carolina.20 5
The United States, in 1887, demanded that Mexico return a
Mexican Army Lieutenant whose fellow officers had rescued him in
Arizona from arrest and imprisonment on a charge of assaulting a
constable. 20 6 The Mexican government initially agreed to return
him, but later asked if his trial and that of the officers involved in
his rescue by Mexican authorities would suffice.20 7 Having agreed,
the U.S. government later found it necessary to request that Mex-
ico mitigate the sentences of death meted out by its military court
199. See 1 JOHN BASSETT MOORE, TREATISE ON EXTRADITION AND INTERSTATE RENDITION
282 (1891).
200. Id. at 283.
201. Letter from the Secretary to the Admiralty to M. Hammond, Esq. (Nov. 27, 1861),
in 55 BRITISH & FOREIGN STATE PAPERS 1864-65, at 602-03 (1870).
202. Id.
203. Letter from Lord Lyons to Earl Russell (Dec. 3, 1861), in 55 BRITISH & FOREIGN
STATE PAPERS 1864-65, at 614-15 (1870). The Secretary of the Navy sent the captain a pub-
lic letter of commendation which ended with the admonition that the San Jacinto's failure
to seize the Trent as well as her passengers should not be treated as a precedent! Letter
from Mr. Welles, Navy Dept. to Captain Wilkes (Nov. 30, 1861), in 55 BRITISH & FOREIGN
STATE PAPERS 1864-65, at 617-18 (1870).
204. See Letter from William H. Seward, U.S. Secretary of State, to Lord Lyons (Dec.
26, 1861) Letters from Earl Russell to Lord Lyons (Jan. 10, 1862 & Jan. 23, 1862) in 55
BRITISH & FOREIGN STATE PAPERS 1864-65, at 627-40, 641-43, 650-57 (1870).
205. See MOORE, supra note 199, at 283-84.
206. Id. at 288.
207. Id. at 289.
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to the Lieutenant and his rescuers!208 Prohibition provoked even
more incidents. °9
In the Colunje Claim case, the United States-Panama Claims
Commission considered the Panamanian Government's claim aris-
ing from Guillermo Colunje's arrest.210 In 1917, a Panama Canal
Zone detective arrested Colunje for mail fraud after the detective
persuaded him, by false pretence, to enter the Canal Zone.21
1
Colunje regained the safety of his own country by posting bond,
and the Canal Zone prosecutor later dropped the charge. 12 The
Commission held that the United States was liable to the Panama-
nian government for damages for its citizen's "humiliation incident
to a criminal proceeding.
213
When the Soviet government apparently attempted to recover
a defector who had jumped from a window in the Soviet Consulate,
the U.S. Department of State declared that the "[g]overnment of
the United States cannot permit the exercise within the United
States of the police power of any foreign government.
214
2. Canadian Practice which Illustrates a Norm Against
Abductions
Canadian practice in cross-border abduction cases also sup-
ports a norm against abductions. Canada receives fifty percent of
all federal extradition requests."' Canada provides sixty percent of
208. Id. at 290.
209. When a Justice Department and two Internal Revenue officials arrested a sus-
pected bootlegger on his boat in British waters off Bimini in 1920, the U.S. government
reprimanded the agents, suspended them, disavowed their unauthorized action, and
quashed the bootlegger's prosecution. See 1 GREEN HAYWOOD HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTER-
NATIONAL LAW 624 (1940). In another incident a U.S. Coast Guard boatswain seized two
rum-running vessels close to Cat Cay and took them and their crew back to Florida for trial.
Id. at 625. After the British Vice-Consul in Miami presented a request for the boatswain's
extradition to the Bahamas, the two governments reached a satisfactory compromise includ-
ing the return of the ships and their cargoes, dismissal of the crew members' prosecution,
and an official United States expression of regret. Id.
210. 1933-34 ANNUAL DIGEST AND REPORTS OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW CASES 250-51




214. See U.S. Rejects Soviet Charges Concerning Refusal of Two Russian Teachers to
Return to Soviet Union, 19 DEP'T ST. BULL. 251, 253 (1948).
215. Brief of the Government of Canada as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondent at




all extraditions to the United States in response to requests made
by our states (as opposed to the federal government).2 6
Canada frequently and consistently reiterates its position that
transborder abductions to the United States violate both Canada's
sovereignty and the United States-Canada extradition treaty.'
The Canadian Amicus Brief in Alvarez-Machain discusses several
such abduction cases.218
Sydney Jaffe's abduction, for example, is the case that trig-
gered the strongest Canadian reaction.219 On September 24, 1981,
U.S. bounty hunters, allegedly at Florida's instigation, abducted
Jaffe from Toronto and brought him to Florida, where he was tried
and convicted of fraud.220 The Canadian government objected to
Jaffe's arrest and imprisonment in fifteen diplomatic notes be-
tween 1981 and 1986.221 In 1983 Canada filed a habeas corpus ac-
tion on Jaffe's behalf 2 22 The U.S. Departments of Justice and
State requested the Florida Probation and Parole Commission to
grant Jaffe an early release, and Jaffe returned to Canada in
1983.223
During the furor over the Jaffe case, and again in 1992, Ca-
nada solicited statements from other states regarding their posi-
tions on official transborder abductions. 224 Austria, Britain, Fin-
land, Germany, The Netherlands, Norway, New Zealand, Sweden,
and Switzerland all stated that they would protest against such ab-
ductions as a violation of their sovereignty. 2 5 Switzerland objected
that such an abduction contravened the "loyalty and good faith"
principle of international law.226 Australia, Britain, Norway, Swe-
den, and New Zealand considered transborder abductions to be a
216. Id. at app. la, 3a (Statement of Secretary of State George P. Shultz to the State of
Florida Probation and Parole Commission, In re Jaffe, June 22, 1983).
217. Treaty of Extradition, Dec. 3, 1971, U.S.-Can., 27 U.S.T. 985.
218. Canada Amicus Brief, supra note 215, at 9-11, Alvarez-Machain (No. 91-712).
219. See Jaffe v. Smith, 825 F.2d 304 (11th Cir. 1987); Canada Amicus Brief, supra
note 215, at 10-12, app. A, Alvarez-Machain (No. 91-712); see also Wade A. Buser, Com-
ment, The Jaffe Case and the Use of International Kidnapping as an Alternative, 14 GA. J.
INT'L & Comp. L. 357 (1984).
220. Jaffe v. Boyles, 616 F. Supp. 1371, 1373 (W.D.N.Y. 1985).
221. Canada Amicus Brief, supra note 215, at 11 n.5, Alvarez-Machain (No. 91-712).
222. Id.
223. Id. at 11.





violation of bilateral extradition treaties.227 Britain, Finland, Ger-
many, and Sweden would demand the abducted person's return.22 8
Most notably, if their officials carried out the abduction, Austria,
Finland, The Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland be-
lieved that the abducted person should be repatriated.2 9
These incidents demonstrate that U.S., Canadian, and inter-
national practice has contributed to two critical customary law
rules. One rule forbids law enforcement activity by one state with-
out permission in the territory of another state. The second rule
forbids official abductions from a country's territory without its
permission.
They also demonstrate the corollary norm that a nation in
which an abduction has occurred has the right to demand the ab-
ducted person's return; and, more importantly, when the injured
state makes such a demand, the abducting state must comply.
230
Failure to comply with such a demand is a further breach of inter-
national law.
2 1
B. U.S. Assent to Customary International Law Restricts
U.S. Courts' Jurisdiction
The U.S. Supreme Court, in The Paquete Habana,32 firmly
established that customary international law is U.S. law.233 It is
also federal law, and binding on the states.2 4 The United States
has not only assented to the customary international law norm
against law enforcement activity in another state,3 3 but actively
participated in its establishment.2 36 Therefore, the United States
has assented to a norm which prohibits extraterritorial abductions
by its agents without the permission of the other country.




230. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 189, § 432, cmt. c; Mann, supra note 183, at 411;
O'Higgins, supra note 29, at 293-96.
231. See Mann, supra note 183, at 411.
232. 175 U.S. 677 (1900).
233. See id. at 700; RESTATEMENT, supra note 189, § 111(1).
234. See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 425 (1964); RESTATEMENT,
supra note 189, § 111 reporters' note 2.
235. See supra text accompanying notes 192-231.
236. See supra text accompanying notes 192-231.
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its courts should lack personal jurisdiction over those abducted.
The U.S. Supreme Court has agreed.
In Cook v. United States,2 37 the Supreme Court held that U.S.
courts lacked personal jurisdiction over a ship seized in violation of
a treaty which limited U.S. territorial authority.238 The Court rea-
soned that, without the authority to seize, the United States had
no jurisdiction over the subjects.239
Even though Cook involved treaty law, rather than customary
international law, scholars have argued that there is no logical or
legal difference between the two types of international law.24 °
Therefore, Cook's holding that U.S. courts have no jurisdiction
over defendants seized in violation of a treaty should also apply to
customary international law violations.241
The actual existence of an international norm of male captus,
bene detentus might impair this conclusion's validity. Neverthe-
less, state practice evincing its existence is, at best, inconclusive.242
C. Is Male Captus, Bene Detentus International Law?
The exercise of personal jurisdiction by a court over a criminal
defendant brought before it by official abduction from the territory
of a nonconsenting country which clearly violates international law
is, some commentators have ruefully observed, a norm supported
by state practice.243 Others have announced the rule's existence
without criticism.244 Close examination of actual state practice and
other sources, however, suggests that male captus, bene detentus
may not extend to non-consensual official abductions.
237. 288 U.S. 102 (1933).
238. Id. at 121-22. For a brief discussion of Cook, see supra text accompanying notes
165-75.
239. Cook, 288 U.S. at 121.
240. Dickinson, supra note 69, at 237; Garcia-Mora, supra note 13, at 445-46.
241. Two cases which reach the opposite result are The Ship Richmond, 13 U.S. (9
Cranch) 102 (1815) and The Merino, 22 U.S. (9 Wheaton) 391 (1824). However, these cases
were decided when customary international law was not the equivalent of U.S. treaties or
statutes, before the Court decided The Paquete Habana in 1900.
242. See infra text accompanying notes 243-69.
243. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT, supra note 189, § 432, reporters' note 2; M. CHERIF BAS-
SIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION: UNITED STATES LAW AND PRACTICE 190 (2d rev. ed.
1987).
244. See, e.g., Malvina Halberstam, In Defense of the Supreme Court Decision in Alva-
rez-Machain, 86 AM. J. INT'L L. 736, 737-38 (1992); John M. Rogers, Prosecuting Terrorists:
When Does Apprehension in Violation of International Law Preclude Trial?, 42 U. MIAMI




Some commentators who have examined the jurisprudence be-
hind male captus, bene detentus conclude that the doctrine may
not extend to non-consensual official abductions.
For instance, Professor Brownlie states the general rule that,
"[w]hile international responsibility may arise as a consequence of
the illegal seizure of offenders, the violation of the law does not
affect the validity of the subsequent exercise of jurisdiction over
them.12 5 But he adds that "[t]his is the view adopted by courts in
many states and by some writers. Much depends on the existence
of independently sustainable grounds for the actual exercise of
jurisdiction or of a waiver of a claim to reconduction."' 6 There-
fore, Brownlie concludes that the general rule should not apply
when a country expressly objects to an abduction in its territory.
Brownlie refers his readers to four sources. One of these, the
Harvard Research in International Law's Draft Convention on
Jurisdiction with Respect to Crime, supports his exception and
challenges the doctrine of male captus, bene detentus,4 7 The au-
thors of the Draft Convention admitted that in Britain, the United
States, and perhaps elsewhere national law did not accord with its
proposal.248 They cited Ker v. Illinois,24 9 State v. Brewster,250 and
The Ship Richmond,2 51 among other sources as not in accord with
their article, but cited other national and international practices
for support.25 2 They certainly did not argue that male captus, bene
detentus was an established international norm.53
245. IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 317 (4th ed. 1990) (cita-
tions omitted).
246. Id. at 317. n.6 (emphasis added).
247. See Harvard Research in International Law, Draft Convention on Jurisdiction
with Respect to Crime, art. 16, in 29 AM. J. INT'L L. 437, 442 (Supp. 1935) [hereinafter Draft
Convention] "[N]o State shall prosecute or punish any person who has been brought within
its territory or a place subject to its authority by recourse to measures in violation of inter-
national law or international convention without first obtaining the consent of the State or
States whose rights have been violated by such measures." Id.
248. Id. at 628.
249. 119 U.S. 436 (1886).
250. 7 Vt. 117 (1835).
251. 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 102 (1815).
252. See Draft Convention, supra note 247, at 628-32.
253. The authors' criticism of U.S. law could be applied to Alvarez-Machain. "It is
believed that the distinction made in the United States law between arrests in violation of
treaty and arrests in violation of customary international law is arbitrary and unsound,
prompted by a shortsighted desire to prosecute the person of whom custody has been ille-
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Professor Dickinson and Mr. O'Higgins, the second and third
of Brownlie's sources, also support Brownlie's conclusion that male
captus, bene detentus does not apply when a country objects to an
abduction in its territory.25 Dickinson was scathingly critical of
Ker and its predecessors, 5 while O'Higgins took pains to show
that cases such as Ex parte Scott2 50 did not involve defendants
whose presence before the courts violated international law.257 In-
deed, he expressed considerable doubt whether a British court
would exercise jurisdiction over a criminal defendant whose mode
of arrival before it violated international law.
2 58
Professor Brownlie's fourth and final source was an article on
the Eichmann trial by J.E.S. Fawcett. Fawcett, after analyzing
many cases, stated "the demand for the reconduction of the of-
fender must prevail over the right of the State, having custody of
him, to try him for an offence against its law, for the practical rea-
son that the State cannot both comply with the demand and retain
him for trial.
'259
Fawcett took pains to demonstrate that Ker, Ex parte Scott,
and similar common law cases involved unofficial abductions with-
out breaches of international law. Therefore, the rule of male cap-
tus, bene detentus which they exemplified should not extend to
cases involving official abductions violating international law.
260
The Eichmann case, he noted, involved a withdrawn Argentine de-
mand for Eichmann's return, and Eichmann's crimes were jure
gentium.
261
Another commentator's analysis led to the opposite conclu-
sion. F.A. Mann asserted, of criminal jurisdiction over a defendant
abducted from another country, that "[ilt would be idle to deny
that such jurisdiction exists, and it exists however abhorrent the
circumstances of the abduction may be."'2 62 Although Mann
gally obtained .... " Id. at 631.
254. See Dickinson, supra note 69, at 231; O'Higgins, supra note 29, at 281.
255. See Dickinson, supra note 69, at 238-41.
256. 109 Eng. Rep. 166 (K.B. 1824).
257. See O'Higgins, supra note 29, at 281-89.
258. Id. at 288-89.
259. J.E.S. Fawcett, The Eichmann Case, 38 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 181, 199 (1964) (cita-
tions omitted).
260. Id. at 194-96.
261. Id. at 199-200.
262. See Mann, supra note 183, at 412. His examples of state practice, however, are
limited. Id. at 412-14. The first was the Eichmann case, one in which the injured country,
Argentina, withdrew its demand for the abducted person's return and where the defendant's
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acknowledged that courts have exercised jurisdiction in abduction
cases, he argued that courts should not exercise jurisdiction.263
Further, he provided evidence of state practice which supports a
conclusion that the rule of male captus, bene detentus should not
apply when a state objects.2 64
Mann reported that when the Netherlands demanded the re-
turn of a defendant in German custody, the German court stated
"that public international law did not preclude the defendant's
prosecution, but the Dutch right of restitution . 'could preclude
the exercise of German jurisdiction.' "265
Male captus, bene detentus permits a state to exercise juris-
diction over a criminal defendant abducted from the territory of a
nonconsenting country. The proposition that male captus, bene
detentus is a customary rule of international law at best remains
to be proven.
2. United States Practice
United States practice until Alvarez-Machain evinced a pre-
sumption of the rule's nonexistence, and a keen awareness that ex-
traterritorial law enforcement activity might violate international
law.266 In a provision of the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement
Prosecution Improvements Act of 1986, for example, the U.S. Con-
gress assumed that an arrest by U.S. officials which violated inter-
national law would divest a U.S. court of its jurisdiction over the
arrested person(s).267 Obviously, Congress assumed that violations
crimes invoked universal jurisdiction. See Fawcett, supra note 259, at 199-200. On universal
jurisdiction, see GILBERT, supra note 29, at 222-23. Next are Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436
(1886), Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519 (1952), and R. v. Officer Commanding Depot Battal-
ion Colchester, ex parte Elliott, [1949] 1 All E.R. 373 (K.B.). The first two involved no
official transnational abduction, and Ker not only lacked a demand for the abducted per-
son's return by Peru, but was pure dictum. In the third case, a British deserter in Belgium
found himself apprehended by two Belgian policemen and British military police. Id. at 373;
see also O'Higgins, supra note 29, at 286. The case, therefore, involved no international law
violation and no Belgian demand for the deserter's return.
263. Mann, supra note 183, at 414-21.
264. Id. at 421 n.72.
265. Id.
266. For keen awareness see FBI AUTHORITY TO SEIZE SUSPECTS ABROAD: HEARING
BEFORE THE SUBCOMM. ON CIVIL AND CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON THE
JUDICIARY, H.R. Doc. No. 134, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 22, 31 (1989) (statement of Abraham D.
Sofaer, Legal Adviser, U.S. Dept. of State) [hereinafter FBI HEARINGS].
267. 46 U.S.C. app. § 1903(d) (1988).
A claim of failure to comply with international law in the enforcement of this
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of international law in the enforcement of other statutes would
divest courts of jurisdiction, and that defendants arriving before
such courts as a result of international law breaches could invoke
these violations.
3. Male Captus, Bene Detentus Is Not International Law
Official abductions in the territory of other nations, without
those countries' permission, plainly violate customary international
law. 268 Equally plain is the right of an injured country to demand
the abducting state to return the abducted person.26 9 Failure to
comply with such a demand is an additional breach of interna-
tional law. State practice evidencing a customary law norm permit-
ting an abducting country's courts to retain such jurisdiction over
a defendant is conspicuously absent. Ker v. Illinois, invariably of-
fered as evidence of such U.S. practice, does not address abduc-
tions breaching international law. Yet, there is direct evidence that
the executive branch of the U.S. government condemns nonconsen-
sual extraterritorial abductions as breaches of international law.
Similarly, the legislative branch assumes that such breaches divest
U.S. courts of jurisdiction over criminal defendants.
IV. THE CHARMING BETSY DOCTRINE SHOULD TRUMP KER
The Charming Betsy, a schooner bound in 1800 from Danish
St. Thomas to the French island of Guadaloupe in the West Indies,
inadvertently prompted a famous canon of legal construction.2 70
The U.S.S. Constellation, patrolling the islands to enforce a non
intercourse act forbidding trade between the United States and
France or her possessions,271 stopped and seized the Charming
Betsy, which was owned by a former U.S. citizen who had moved
to St. Thomas and adopted Danish citizenship.272 On appeal of a
Act may be invoked solely by a foreign state, and a failure to comply with inter-
national law shall not divest a court of jurisdiction or otherwise constitute a de-
fense to any proceeding under this Act.
Id.; see also Lowenfeld, supra note 106, at 480 n.188; Semmelman, supra note 13, at 557.
268. See supra text accompanying notes 189-229; see also Mann, supra note 183, at 407
("A state which authorizes the abduction of a person from the territory of another sovereign
State is guilty of a violation of public international law.").
269. See supra text accompanying notes 230-31.
270. Murray v. The Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 69 (1804).
271. Act of February 27, 1800, 2 Stat. 7.
272. The Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) at 65.
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lower court's decision that the Charming Betsy be restored to its
owner, the Supreme Court had to determine, using standards of
international law, the actual citizenship of the owner."' The Court
decided that the owner was Danish, and that the Charming Betsy
must be returned to him.274 One of the questions the Court had to
answer in reaching its decision was whether the Nonintercourse
Act, which applied by its terms to persons resident in the United
States or under its protection, should apply to a person, originally
a U.S. citizen, who had sworn allegiance to another sovereign and
resided in its territory. Chief Justice Marshall applied interna-
tional law standards regarding diplomatic protection to decide this
question and, in the process, enunciated what has since been called
the Charming Betsy doctrine: "It has also been observed that an
act of Congress ought never to be construed to violate the law of
nations if any other possible construction remains.
2 75
Since 1804, the Court has employed this principle repeatedly
to construe statutes .2 76 This same principle should control when a
common law canon like the Ker-Frisbie doctrine, developed by the
Court solely in the context of domestic, due process issues, con-
flicts with international law. When the executive branch maintains
that official nonconsensual abductions in other nations are interna-
tional law violations,277 and the legislative branch presumes juris-
dictional divestment,278  the judiciary should respect these
branches' powers to shape U.S. practice in international law by ap-
plying the appropriate canon to avoid an international law
violation. 9
273. Id. at 120-21.
274. Id.
275. Id. at 118. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 189, § 114 (1987). For a comprehensive
discussion of this principle's ramifications, see Ralph G. Steinhardt, The Role of Interna-
tional Law as a Canon of Domestic Statutory Construction, 43 VAND. L. REV. 1103 (1990).
276. See, e.g., Weinberger v. Rossi, 456 U.S. 25, 33 (1982) (finding executive agreements
to be treaties within the meaning of the word treaties in a statute); McCulloch v. Sociedad
Nacional de Marineros de Honduras, 372 U.S. 10, 21 (1963) (interpreting the National La-
bor Relations Act to avoid conflict with customary maritime law); Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345
U.S. 571, 578 (1953) (interpreting the application of the Jones Act to foreign seamens'
claims).
277. See FBI HEARINGS, supra note 266, at 31.
278. See supra text accompanying notes 267-68.
279. For the Court's own acknowledgement that all branches of the U.S. government
shape customary international law, see The Nereide, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 388, 422-23 (1815).
Chief Justice Marshall, discussing the seizure of goods in retaliation for another nation's
confiscation of U.S. property, said:
It may be the policy of the nation to avenge its wrongs in a manner having no




The Ker-Frisbie doctrine originated in dictum. Further, the
common law sources cited in its support, like the dictum itself,
were not factually similar. They applied only to unofficial extrater-
ritorial abductions which were unprotested by the nations in whose
territory they took place. Neither the Ker case nor its common law
forbears involved an actual breach of international law. In addi-
tion, Ker's invocation by the U.S. Supreme Court from 1886 to
1992 always served as a device to defeat due process claims of
criminal defendants abducted within the United States. When ad-
vanced in the two cases of that period which involved treaty viola-
tions, the Court expressly found Ker-Frisbie irrelevant.
Whether an international law norm of male captus, bene
detentus exists has yet to be proven. A significant part of the state
practice cited as evidence for this rule's existence is a distorted
reading of Ker v. Illinois, which is completely unjustified by its
holding or the actual dicta on forcible abductions itself.
The Ker-Frisbie doctrine lacks international content. The doc-
trine also bears no relationship to existing international law norms
that prohibit unilateral abductions. It is a long-standing principle
that U.S. courts should interpret domestic law, including Ker-Fris-
bie, in a way that it does not conflict with international law. All of
these factors compel the conclusion that the Ker-Frisbie doctrine
does not preserve our courts' jurisdiction to try criminal defend-
ants whose abductions abroad breach international law and whose
return the countries injured by such breaches demand.
rights and not to avenge them at all. It is not for its Courts to interfere with the
proceedings of the nation and to thwart its views. It is not for us to depart from
the beaten track prescribed for us, and to tread the devious and intricate path of
politics. Even in the case of salvage, a case peculiarly within the discretion of
Courts, because no fixed rule is prescribed by the law of nations, congress has
not left it to this department to say whether the rule of foreign nations shall be
applied to them, but has by law applied that rule. If it be the will of the govern-
ment to apply to Spain any rule respecting captures which Spain is supposed to
apply to us, the government will manifest that will by passing an act for the
purpose. Till such an act be passed, the Court is bound by the law of nations
which is a part of the law of the land.
Id.; see also The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900) (announcing, again, that inter-
national law is United States' law and that courts must ascertain it, in the absence of "con-
trolling executive or legislative act or judicial decision," from state practice).
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